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Abstract. This research focuses on investigating changes in the financial diplomacy of the 
Norwegian firms’ leverages due to the decrease in banks’ lending as a consequence of the 
financial crisis shock wave. The research question is whether the leverage ratio measured as 
debt-to-equity significantly declined as a consequence of the credit crunch. Its purpose is to 
analyze the relationship between firms, financial diplomacy and banks and find out its 
implications on the capital structure, answering to the question whether firms whose bank 
received a large shock after Lehman Brothers’ default changed their capital structure or they 
found substitutes for bank lending. This paper does not study whether the changes in financial 
leverage led to a decreased performance of the companies, the research focuses on the 
relationship between Norwegian financial diplomacy and firms, emphasizing how performance 
of the banks influences the way in which a company finances its assets and which substitutes 
does it have when there is a credit crunch.  
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Economic diplomacy has been transformed in the last two decades with the 
end of the Cold War and the advance of globalization. Financial diplomacy, a 
subset of economic diplomacy, changed more slowly, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, while not achieving universal 
membership, remained the dominant institutions. Resolutions of the last 
financial crisis of the 21st century followed the usual pattern. The finance 
ministers of the Group of Seven developed countries (G7) led by the United 
Stated of America, encouraged the IMF to mount rescue packages linked to 
policy reforms (Bayne, 2008). The G7 countries then worked out for „new 
international financial architecture” to be adopted by the IMF and the 
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World Bank and to prevent the recurrence of similar problems (Bayne, 
2008). 
 
This paper examines the importance of financial diplomacy in economic 
diplomacy under investigation of the banking system. In my study, 
economic diplomacy involves the states and their external economic 
relations, as well as the methods of taking and negotiating their decisions 
and strategies at domestic or international level. The tools of economic 
diplomacy in this situation are: ministers, private companies, civil society, 
transparency, and the role of international financial institutions, particulary 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which is focused on financial diplomacy, 
finance ministers and central banks (Bayne, 2008).  
  
The last financial economic crisis raises important challenges for Europe 
countries that could use their convening authority to establish a new regime 
of financial diplomacy (Calestous, 2009). The financial crisis from 2008 
affected also the European banking system, not only the US one. The 
turmoil, which started due to subprime loans and derivative products, 
negatively influenced the West European banks, which in turn transmitted 
the shock, through their ownership to the Central and Eastern European 
banks.  
 
The increase in loans was an effect of the increasing demand for 
consumption in countries from East and Central Europe. Due to the fact that 
in this region the capital market is not developed enough, the individuals 
and companies that needed financing, had to apply for a loan, leading to an 
increase in the demand for loans. Taking into account that these banks 
cannot raise all money required to give all the loans, they have to find 
another source of funding, that was very expensive and that had no liquidity 
problems. The financing came from the West European banks that had 
strong influence in the Central and Eastern European countries due to their 
ownership in the banks from these countries. It is worth mentioning that 
the West European banks had also to search for external financing, using 
the US money market, which was cheaper, to get the required funds. 
 
The financial crisis from 2008 produced massive changes in the way 
economic actors behave. The Lehman Brothers’ default surprised 
everybody, plunging the entire system into chaos. All over the world, the 
shock was transmitted to banks, which found difficulties to raise finance in 
the money markets. Financial diplomacy has a very important role in the 
way a firm is financing its activity, therefore any change in the stability of 
the bank may influence the capital structure of its borrower. This paper 
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analyzes whether the shocks to banks had any effects on financial 
diplomacy and on companies’ capital structure. 
 
The topic is interesting to study because it explains the impact of a large 
financial disequilibrium on real economy by analyzing the factors that 
determined firms’ leverage and looking at the lending-borrowing 
relationship. In addition, it is important to study the capital structure 
because for investors a strong balance sheet is a criterion taken into 
consideration when they invest in a company, and one of the measurements 
to evaluate the strength of the balance sheet is the capital structure. The 
ability of banks to lend increases if it has deposits, therefore saving banks 
may transmit less shock than commercial banks. 
 
Since the crisis started many researchers have quantified the damage 
caused by the credit crunch. Although the evidence regarding the capital 
requirements is mixed, it was shown that it was a very important factor in 
the Norwegian banking system during the 2008 turmoil, making it more 
resistant to shocks, and as a consequence, decreasing the effect of the 
financial crisis on borrowers. Other papers have examined which firms 
were affected the most, Iyer et al. (2010) analyzed whether firms with 
multiple banking relationships could substitute a reduction of credit from 
one of their banks with more from another one much stronger. Few 
researches have approached whether the financial leverage of firms 
decreased because of the credit crunch, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) 
sustained those small firms’ current debt (consisting mainly of bank loans) 
decreases, while that of large firms increases. Kudlyak and Sánchez (2010) 
tested these findings for the 2008 financial crisis and founded that the 
short-term debt of large firms decreases compared to small firms. The 
present paper addresses this gap on the literature by identifying the type of 
the relationship between the two variables.  
 
 
Banking system - problems during the crisis  
 
A bank has two major sources of funding: retail funding and wholesale 
funding. The former is attracted from the households’ deposits, while the 
latter is attracted from other markets, in order to finance bank’s assets 
(loans). Moreover, wholesale funding comprises short-term debt 
instruments, such as interbank loans, repurchase agreement (repos), 
commercial papers and certificates of deposits, as it is shown by Treapăt 
(2013, pp.9-25). According to Borio (2009), and Boot and Thakor (2010), 
the banks relied more on the financial markets leading to short term 
financing and hence in a strong growth of their activities. In the end, this has 
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lead to a mismatch of maturity between assets and liabilities, having an 
important impact regarding the crisis in the banking field.  
 
Another important element that contributed to the diffusion of the financial 
crisis was the globalization process. Given this situation, European banks 
had to find new sources of financing outside their borders and, given the 
accessibility and development of the US dollar market became dependent 
on the US dollar market. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has brought up 
new challenges for European banks in terms of market access and cost in 
order to finance their liabilities. For many banks, the mismatch between the 
maturities of assets, that were long-term and liabilities, that were short-
term, exposed them to liquidity risk, being more vulnerable in case of any 
change in the market. 
 
Moreover, the low level of the US regulation and their supervisory 
responsibility are to blame for the 2008 turmoil because banks agreed to 
give loans to people that were not able to repay the loan together with the 
principal and the interest rates. Banks wanted to increase credit demand. 
The lack of client supervision during the contract was also missing. Another 
problem was that the European banks’ funding was made with a higher 
proportion of short-term debt and little level of equity. If banks had funded 
themselves with equity, they probably would have been able to surpass 
more easily their financial problems and they would have not been in the 
position to search for government help or other type of help that generates 
restrictions over a long period of time.  
 
According to Impavado, Rudolph and Ruggerone (2013), after Lehman 
Brothers’ default, the shock received by the European banking system 
increased because they could not finance anymore on the US money market. 
In order to avoid an even higher financial distress, central banks had to 
provide funds to banks, taking the place of the interbank US dollar market. 
Also, governments were involved in saving banks through capital injections 
and changing the regulation regarding the loans (more restrictive rules). 
The new regulations imposed that banks should finance their activities less 
with wholesale funding and more with consumer deposits and equity.  
 
Due to high domestic demand for credit in European countries with fixed 
exchange rates, there was a need for an inflow of capital. The external 
funding levels (through swaps) were the highest during the crisis because 
European banks were not able anymore to finance through the US money 
market. This external funding of Central and Eastern European countries 
led not only to a rapid growth of credit expansion (more than 50% 
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comparative to last years), but also to imbalances at internal and external 
level and also to an increase of wages and inflation (Impavido, 2013). 
 
From all the regions that used external financing, the countries from Europe 
were the most affected in terms of GDP, because during 2008-2009 the GDP 
in these countries fall from 6% to -5%. In these countries the foreign 
financing has a more important role than in other regions. One of the causes 
of the crisis in Europe is related to the desire of the European states to have 
a financial system that would converge to a set of common rules for all 
member states, starting with the monetary union. Some countries, like 
Ireland and Greece, did not present real financial data about the actual state 
of the economy, which mislead investors and the European Union 
institutions. There are rumors that the EU institutions knew about these 
problems, but accepted high deficit and debt levels during the turmoil for 
some countries, increasing the probability of a crisis affecting the whole 
European financial sector. The European banking system was too 
dependent on the American one and when the latter collapsed, the former 
had serious liquidity and debt problems. Moreover, some of the European 
banks were involved in trading with high-risk financial crisis. Another 
problem was that the banks had also to use part of their funding to finance 
the deficits of the government and they did not have enough money to lend 
to clients, helping them to surpass this difficult moment. In the graph below 
it is presented the situation of the countries affected by the crisis. 
 
 
Figure 1. Financial crisis in the European Union (source: The Economist, A very 
short history of the crisis, Accessed on June 2, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21536871) 
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Another element that had important effects on the dimension and the 
consequences of the crisis in the EU was the role of the rating agencies. 
Because they downgraded the rating for some countries due to crisis’ risks, 
the bond yields have increased as well as the pressure in the bond market, 
leading to more difficulties for government to obtain new funding. The 
government had trouble in raising new funds because the trust of the 
investors had decreased and they were not willing to lend. 
 
  
Effects of bank regulation on credit supply 
 
Due to the fact that government insures banks, their behavior is not 
independent, but is constrained by a series of regulations. Financial 
diplomacy, by financial and diplomatic institutions, also has a systemic 
importance. It intermediates the relationship between capital holders and 
capital borrowers creating liquidity in the economy, therefore regulation is 
required. This subsection will analyze how financial diplomacy affected 
banking regulation and the lending process before and after the credit 
crunch.  
 
Tosti (2008) believes that we are not even half the way through and that the 
next “excellent crashes” will be in the corporate sector (not only carmakers 
are in distress) after disclosing their financial results of 2008 at the 
beginning of next year. In the aftermath of the crisis large multinational 
corporations have been financing strategic suppliers by shortening the 
terms of payments. The fact that commercial aspects prevail on credit risk 
management will increase risk and dry up liquidity from the core business 
(Tosti, 2008). Most likely the public sector will be hit in a further stage and 
we seriously wonder if there will be enough taxpayer-money left by then for 
further rescue plans. Last but not least: the huge amount of liquidity 
provided by the various bail out schemes will produce – sooner or later – 
inflation (Tosti, 2008).  
 
Bank regulators adopted capital rules and standards for capital in relation 
to risk-weighted assets to discipline excessive risk-taking managers. 
Treapăt (2011) argues that Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
created an international standard for regulators to control how much 
capital banks need to put aside to face risks. Basel imposed risk weighting 
of assets and a minimum 8 per cent regulatory capital to limit bank’s 
leverage, hence if banks lend only to top quality borrowers, they could have 
a larger loan portfolio. Since banks offer credits not only to low risk profiles, 
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and sometimes is difficult to evaluate credit risk, as it happen in the 2007-
2008 financial crisis, the capacity of banks’ lending will diminish. 
  
Capital requirements were criticized in the literature because banks failed 
to respect them and they did not prevent the crisis. Cohen (2013) considers 
that if regulation forces banks to save capital too rapidly, there will be 
macroeconomic costs by making the banks to lend less for investments. 
Other studies, like the one of Oxford Economics, suggests that higher capital 
requirements are negatively affecting bank behavior and economy, 
increasing bank lending rates through the increased capital levels, 
requirements to hold more liquid assets, and rationing of the credit for 
shrinking the risk-weighted assets. 
 
Capital regulation of banks was reformed after the financial crisis. Hellwig 
(2010) argues that changes were too small and that model-based approach 
allowed banks to undercapitalize prior the crisis, therefore he thinks strong 
requirements should be put in place. He contradicts Frenkel and Rudolf’s 
statement (2010) that high capital requirements will induce a credit crunch. 
On the other hand, Vallascas and Keasey (2012) had an empirical approach 
on a sample of listed European banks and identified that capital and 
liquidity requirements, as in the Basel III Accord, improve the resistance to 
systemic shocks and that bank size is a key determinant to risk exposure. 
They sustain that smaller economies should have smaller banks to reduce 
risk exposure to systemic events.  
 
Bank lending is exposed to macroeconomic shocks because the demand for 
loan is pro-cyclical. However, credit supply can behave in a different 
manner according to business cycle because banks are likely to smooth 
lending through the cycle (Thakor, 2004), therefore well-capitalized bank 
can face and absorb financial difficulties. Using a sample of Italian banks, 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) found out that bank capital matters in the 
expansion of different shocks to lending, in addition to the existence of 
regulatory capital constraints. Peek and Rosengreen (1995) investigated the 
direct link between regulation and bank lending behavior stating that the 
presence of regulatory actions seriously limits the credit available from 
lenders. They also showed that shrinkage in bank’s assets does not 
necessarily affect borrowers if it is due to securitization.  
 
These regulation measures were taken to discipline through capital 
requirements and to decrease bank’s excessive risk-taking, also called the 
moral hazard problem. Therefore banking regulation affects the lending 
process by decreasing the number of credits. On the other hand, capital 
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requirements helped Norwegian banks to face better the crisis, as shown in 
the following section. 
  
 
Effects of financial crisis in Norway on banking lending  
 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers caused the interbank market to freeze 
due to information asymmetry. The negative effect of the breakdown of 
international money markets was a huge credit supply contraction, 
followed by low investments and economic recession. Norwegian banks 
were financing their activities from international money markets, especially 
from the United States. When money markets started to ask for extremely 
high-risk premiums, they transmitted the shock to Norway’s dollar-based 
money market, being unable to give loans anymore to many companies.  
 
In the literature related to the topic, Iyer et al. (2014) found out that banks 
that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease their 
credit supply more during the crises. They conclude that credit supply 
reduction due to interbank liquidity exposure is much higher for firms that 
are small in size, younger, with lower banking relationship (measured by 
credit volume before crisis). For large firms results are not statistically 
significant. Iyer et al. (2013) also found out that a 10 per cent increase in 
borrowing in the interbank markets prior to the crisis leads to a 4 per cent 
reduction in firm credit availability during the crisis. Furthermore, Vazquez 
and Federico (2012) showed that banks with weaker structural liquidity 
and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail after the 
crisis. The likelihood of bank default increases with bank risk-taking. 
Norwegian banks have managed to perform better than other foreign 
counterparts due to several factors. Vazquez and Federico (2012) have 
shown that they were better capitalized, conformed to more regulation, able 
to find faster other sources of liquidities and they were not very exposed to 
the real estate market. Norwegian regulation has not allowed the type of 
securitization seen in the US and other markets.  
 
The situation in Norway was improved due to the intervention of the 
government and the central bank. To support the equity capital of banks, 
which is important in the lending process, the Government Finance Fund 
and the Government Bond Fund were created. The crisis and the 
government encouraged measures that made markets to requite a higher 
tier 1 capital than the standard, especially for banks that were borrowing 
from international money markets. Banks that were using their own models 
to calculate Basel II requirements had to hold in 2008 at least 90 per cent of 
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the requirement from Basel I. Norway’s regulation was more solid than in 
other major financial markets. The fact that Norwegian Banks had higher 
capital than it was demanded helped them to face increased losses, lower 
revenues, and to get access to capital easier. The interbank rates started to 
decline after central bank’s infusion of liquidity and low interest rate policy.  
 
Bank lending to the corporate sector was very high before the crisis. Large 
firms’ demand for loans in the Norwegian credit market increased during 
the crisis due to additional restrictions imposed by foreign banks and 
difficulties in obtaining loans in securities markets. In an important 
contribution, Murfin (2009) investigated how lender shocks have an impact 
on the loan strictness. He found evidence that banks write tighter contracts 
after suffering payment defaults to their own loan portfolios and that 
contract tightening is most pronounced for borrowers who are dependent 
on a small circle of lenders. Other papers that have examined the topic are 
the ones written by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Rosengren (2008) 
who studied various shocks to lenders on credit availability in the economy.  
 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) showed that new loans to large borrowers 
fell by 47 per cent during the peak of the financial crisis and by 79 per cent 
relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the Lehman Brothers default, 
there was a run by short-term creditors, making it difficult to roll over their 
short-term debt. They also showed that banks cut lending less if they had 
better access to deposits. According to these studies, the financial crisis 
negatively affected firms by decreasing their access to bank loans. Large 
borrowers were affected by the credit crunch, but the most affected firms 
were the small ones, with not too many alternatives of funding. The less 
affected were firms whose banks had better access to deposits, higher 
liquidity, lower leverage, and less dependence on international money 
markets. In Norway, most of the banks were highly exposed to dollar-based 
money markets and most of the companies were financed through bank 
loans prior the crisis, therefore there are enough reasons to question 
whether the shock received by lenders reflected in a decrease of the 
borrowers’ leverage.  
 
The present research complements the Ivashina and Scharfstein’s paper 
concerning the ability of saving banks to overcome financial turmoil by not 
forcing borrowers to adjust their balance sheets’ right side. Norwegian 
banks had higher capital than it was demanded, managing to face better the 
crisis. The government adopted several measures to increase banks’ 
liquidity, but were these measures enough to absorb the shock and not to 
produce any changes in the firms’ capital structure? We analyze whether 
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Norwegian banks that performed better in this context succeeded to have a 
smaller negative impact on its borrowers.  
 
 
Substitutes for bank lending  
 
The banking crisis affected real economy by changing the opportunities of 
the private sector to access credits to fund their investments and 
consumption. Liquidity shocks to banks might negatively affect firms if they 
cannot face the credit constraints from the more affected banks. If firms 
could substitute credit easily, they could not be affected by the credit supply 
reduction, therefore the effects of the crisis would be small. It is important 
to analyze if firms had chosen other alternatives when banks were in shock 
because firms’ capital structure might have not suffer any changes if bank 
credits were replaced by other types of debt. This subsection analyzes 
firms’ various alternatives of financing sources to understand which ones 
were preferred and were available before and during the financial crisis.  
 
According to the pecking order theory, the cost of financing increases with 
asymmetric information, hence companies rank their financing sources, 
preferring internal financing, then debt, and lastly equity. Taken into 
account this theory, we assume that when firms had to face the effects of the 
credit crunch, they preferred first to look for other debt alternatives, rather 
than changing their capital structure by issuing new equity. As the theory 
argues, managers have more information about the company and when 
they issue new equity, investors may believe that the firm is overvalued. As 
a consequence, investors will offer a lower price, making the issuance of 
new equity less preferable.  
 
The empirical literature tried to demonstrate that firms choose their capital 
structure according to their characteristics. Due to tax shield, the net benefit 
of debt is positive; therefore firms will likely prefer more debt to equity. 
During the credit crunch from 2008 lending was not available anymore; 
therefore the estimation of firms’ leverage should not include only 
determinants of the demand side, but also factors of the supply side 
(Faulender & Petersen, 2006).  
 
Chava and Purnanandam (2009) showed that firms whose banks were 
exposed to 1998 Russian crisis and that primarily relied on bank capital 
suffered larger valuation losses than firms that had access to the public 
debt-market. Greenspan (1999) suggests that in countries where the capital 
markets are well developed, the impact of distressed banks is less negative.  
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Even if some firms choose to borrow from the bond market, many others 
are still exclusively dependent on banks. Bank loans are the most important 
source of external funding in most countries (Mayer, 1990). In addition, 
information asymmetry plays an important role when firms have to choose 
their financing sources. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), adverse 
selection costs are the most important factor in capital structure decision 
making. Capital markets are more transparent compared to banks, so we 
might 11 think that borrowers prefer banks. Nevertheless, the presence of 
information asymmetry makes harder the evaluation of the firms’ credit 
worthiness; therefore banks may not fund many good projects (Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981). When there is a strong competition on funding, banks have to 
choose the well performing companies (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). When 
credit markets froze after Lehman Brothers’ default, financial institutions 
could not measure the real risk exposure and decided not to lend anymore. 
Furthermore, Bernanke (1983) argues in one of its studies that economic 
institutions affect costs of transaction between lenders and borrowers, 
therefore credits are given harder during crises and easier otherwise.  
 
In an important contribution based on Spanish SMEs, Carbo-Valverde et al. 
(2012) show that firms affected by the credit crunch used trade credit as an 
alternative source of financing. They found that financially constrained 
firms depend more on trade credit and the financial crisis increased the 
number of credit-constrained companies. Other findings suggest that in the 
US stronger large firms gave more trade credit to weaker large firms during 
the financial crisis (Garcia-Appendini & Montoriol-Garriga, 2011). Although 
there are other sources of finance that provide the same services as banks, 
Hoshi et al. (1990, 1991) argue that decreases in bank lending are usually 
not substituted by other external funds, and they continue with an 
increased dependence of investment on earnings.  
 
According to the existing literature and theories, firms prefer credits as a 
main source of finance, instead of borrowing from the capital market or 
issuing new equity, both being more expensive than credits. The present 
thesis tests the hypothesis whether firms decreased their leverage due to 
the credit crunch and will complement Carbo-Valverde et al.’s research, 
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Hypotheses and models  
 
This section states the hypotheses tested and presents the statistical 
variables that will be applied to the sample.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Borrowers from banks whose stock price dropped substantially 
were more affected than borrowers from banks whose stock price dropped 
less. The research tests whether banks that performed worse by having big 
decreases in stock price had a larger negative impact on its borrowers’ 
leverage.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms changed their capital structure, by decreasing their 
leverage due to the credit crunch. We may think that a contraction in banks’ 
credit supply decreases the leverage of firms, making them to change their 
capital structure. This hypothesis testing’s result offers a better 
understanding of the causality between the two.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The capital structure of firms that borrow from saving banks 
was less affected than capital structure of firms that borrow from commercial 
banks. This hypothesis complements Ivashina and Scharfstein’s paper, 
which showed that banks that had access to deposits affected less its 
borrowers.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Norwegian firms substituted bank loans with trade credit. 
Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012) already showed that small and medium 
companies from Spain used trade credit when bank loans were not 
available anymore during the crisis. By testing this hypothesis, I investigate 
whether firms choose to lend to each other to overcome the lack of banking 
financing in Norway.  
 
The dependent variable represents the firms’ capital structure and is 
quantified by the leverage ratio measured as debt-to-equity for company i, 
year t.  
 
 Leverage i,t = Debt i,t / Equity i,t 
 
To measure the shock received by banks during the financial crisis, I use as 
independent variable banks’ return. The financial distress faced by banks 
during the credit contraction and their inability of lending is information 
that was most likely reflected in the share price. The variable is linked to its 
borrower i. To identify whether the third hypothesis is true, I include a 
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dummy variable TypeBank i,t which is 1 in case of a saving bank, and 0 in 
case of a commercial bank.  
 
The dependent variable for the fourth hypothesis is the trade credit 
measured by debt to companies in the same group. To distingue whether 
the observation is before or after the crisis, I will include a dummy variable 
LBT i,t which will take the value 1 if the observation is after 2008 (Lehman 





There is no evidence that the financial diplomacy during the crisis that 
affected the West European banks was transmitted to the Central and 
Eastern European banks, where the former had ownership. Although there 
is empirical evidence that did not sustain this hypothesis, in my analysis of 
the relation between the West European banks and the Central and Eastern 
European banks during the crisis, there was no significant result leading to 
establishing a direct link between them.  
 
The datasets will include banks’ share prices collected from the Oslo Stock 
Exchange and information about Norwegian firms from different sources. 
Norwegian companies are required to publish their financial statements; 
therefore information about their capital structure will be collected from 
their balance sheet. The sample of firms will include only non-financial 
companies and the bank sample will contain only the ones related to the 
Norwegian firms.  
      
To analyze the situation before and after the crisis, the sample will contain 
data from ten years. The variables will have values from 2003 to 2012. The 
period before the credit crunch will be from the end of 2003 to the end of 
2007, year 2008 will mark the start of the credit crunch as the Lehman 
Brothers defaulted during that year, and the effects of the crisis will be 
included in the period from the end of 2008 to the end of 2012. Since the 
debt and equity are reported at the end of a financial year, the data in the 
sample will be annually. 
 
Due to the fact that the level of this integration was low, the problems that 
the European states faced were greater. An advantage of the integration is 
that it insures financial stability for all member states. On the other hand it 
provide the same requirements for bank credit in all member states. 
Because there are some states that are reluctant regarding the advantages 
of this integration, the implementation of this process has difficulties (Ilie, 
184 | Dan DUMITRIU 




2014). European banking system integration, as well as the financial 
diplomacy, offers efficiency and diversification advantages, but also 
disadvantages such as the risk that distress at cross-border level will lead to 
a reduction in banks’ activity even if the environment in which the banks 
are operating is not directly affected by the origins of the distress. 
 
 
Acknowledgement: The current paper represents a work in 
progress and it will be continued with further findings and 
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